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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
OCT 2 0 1988 THE 1987-1988 TERM (PART II) 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead 1/1 & Richard W Weatherhead 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the second of two articles reviewing this Term's 
decisions by the United States Supreme Court. 
DEATH PENALTY 
Age of Defendant 
The defendant in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 
2687 (1988), was 15 years old when he participated in a 
brutal murder. The prosecution's motion to have 
Thompson tiied as an adult iathei than as a juvenile was 
granted. He was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
the imposition of the death penalty for a crime committed 
by a 15-year-old child violated the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 
The plurality commenced its analysis by observing 
that the drafters of the Eighth Amendment made no 
attempt to define what constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment. Consequently, the Court has made that 
determination guided by the "evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 
Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
In this context, the Court has looked to legislative enact-
ments, sentencing jury determinations, and the reasons 
underlying such laws and decisions. 
The plurality first considered the legislative treatment 
of 15-year-old children. No state permits children of that 
age to vote or serve on juries. In all but one state a 15-
year-old may not drive without parental consent. Simiiar-
ly, in all but four states, a 15-year-old cannot marry with-
out parental consent. Most importantly, all states designate 
the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction at not 
less than 16. "All of this legislation is consistent with the 
experience of mankind, as well as the long history of our 
law, that the normal15-year-old is not prepared to assume 
the full responsibilities of an adult." 108 S.Ct. at 2693. 
Most states have not set a minimum age for the imposi-
tion of the death penalty. However, of the 18 states that 
have set a minimum age, all require that the defendant 
have attained the age of 16 at the time of the offense. 
.Next the plurality reviewed jury behavior. The best 
evidence indicates that between 18 and 20 children 
under 16 have been executed in this century. Significant-
ly, none had been executed since 1948. The plurality 
believed that this forty-year moratorium was important. 
"The road we have traveled during the past four decades 
-in which thousands of juries have tried murder cases 
-leads to the unambiguous conclusion that the imposi-
tion of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now 
generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community." 
. /d. at 2697. 
Finally, the plurality examined the reasons underlying 
the differential treatment of children. "Inexperience, less 
education, and less intelligence make the teenager less 
able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct 
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be 
motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an 
adult." /d. at 2699. Given these factors, retribution and 
deterrence, the underlying rationales for the death penal-
ty, do not apply. The child is less culpable, and he is less 
likely to be deterred. Accordingly, the plurality found the 
death penalty violative of the Eighth Amendment. The 
plurality, however, limited its decision to children under 16. 
The decisive vote was cast by Justice O'Connor, who 
wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice O'Connor 
agreed in the judgment but on narrower grounds. The 
constitutional violation, in her view, was the legislature's 
failure to specify a minimum age: "In this unique situa-
tion, I am prepared to conclude that petitioner and others 
who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense 
may not be executed under the authority of a capital 
punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at 
which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the 
offender's execution." /d. at 4904. 
Jury Selection 
Ross v. Oklahoma, 108 S.Ct. 2273 (1988), concerned 
the jury selection process in a capital murder case. By 
statute, each side had nine peremptory challenges. 
Twelve jurors were initially selected and examined by the 
court and counsel. If a juror was excused for cause, 
Public Defender Hyman Friedman 
Cuyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender. 
Copyright ~) 1988 Paul Giannelli 
another was called and examined. After 12 jurors had 
been provisionally seated, the parties exercised their 
peremptory challenges alternately. The prosecutor went 
first. When a juror was struck, a replacement was called 
and examined. Once the replacement was provisionally 
seated, the strikes would continue until all the perempto-
ry challenges had been used or waived. 
Darrell Huling was a replacement for the juror excused 
due to the defense's exercise of its fifth peremptory. 
During examination, he stated that he would automatical-
ly impose the death penalty if the defendant were found 
guilty. The defense moved to challenge him for cause. 
When the motion was denied, the defense used a per-
emptory challenge to have him removed. The proceed-
ings continued until the defense had used all of its 
peremptory challenges. Ross was subsequently convict-
ed and sentenced to death. He argued that the trial 
court's failure to strike Huling violated his right to an 
impartial jury and due process. 
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed. There was 
no dispute that the trial court had committed an error in 
not striking Huling. Had Huling remained on the jury, 
Ross's right to an impartial jury would have been violat-
ed. Huling, however, was not on the jury. He was re-
moved with a peremptory challenge. Moreover, none of 
the 12 jurors who sat were challenged for cause, nor did 
Ross ever suggest that any of them was not impartial. 
Ross;s argument focused on the fact that had he not 
had to use his peremptory challenge on Huling, he might 
have struck one of the other jurors. Thus, the jury panel 
would have been different. The Court simply did not 
believe that this difference was significant. 
[W]e reject the notion that the loss of a peremptory 
challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional 
right to an impartial jury. We have long recognized that 
peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimen-
sion ... They are a means to achieve the end of an 
impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, 
the fact that the defendant had to use a peremptory 
challenge to achieve that result does not mean the 
Sixth Amendment was violated. /d. at 2278. 
Right to Counsel 
Satterwhite v. Texas, 108 S.Ct. 1792 (1988), involved 
the violation of the right to counsel in a capital sentenc-
ing hearing. Satterwhite was indicted for a murder 
committed during a robbery. Counsel was appointed 
thereafter. Unknown to counsel, a psychiatrist inter-
viewed Satterwhite in order to determine his competency 
to stand trial, his insanity at the time of the offense, and 
his future dangerousness. The latter is an aggravating 
circumstance under the Texas death penalty law. After 
conviction, the psychiatrist testified at the sentencing 
hearing that Satterwhite presented a continuing threat to 
society through acts of criminal violence. 
The Supreme Court ruled that the psychiatric interview 
was unconstitutional under Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 
(1981), in which the Court had held that defendants for-
mally charged with capital crimes have a Sixth Amend-· 
ment right to counsel before submitting to psychiatric 
examinations designed to determine their future danger-
ousness. 
Next, the Court considered whether this violation 
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constituted harmless error. Some constitutional errors 
cast so much doubt on the fairness of the process that 
they can never be considered harmless. For example, 
Sixth Amendment violations that pervade the entire 
proceeding fall within this category. Thus, in Holloway v. 
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978), the Court wrote: "[W)hen 
a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance 
of his attorney, either throughout the prosecution or 
during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of a 
capital case, reversal is automatic." /d. at 489. A different 
analysis, however, controls when a right to counsel viola-
tion is limited to the erroneous admission of particular 
evidence. Hence, confessions and line-ups conducted in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment are subject to harmless 
error analysis. See Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 
(1972); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977). According to 
the Court, these latter cases governed. 
In applying the harmless error rule, however, the Court 
could not conclude that the error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The psychiatrist was the only licensed 
physician to testify at the sentencing hearing and his 
opinion was devastating: Satterwhite was "beyond the 
reach of psychiatric rehabilitation." Consequently, the 
judgment was reversed. 
Aggravating Circumstance - Prior Conviction 
The defendant in Johnson v. Mississippi, 108 S.Ct. 
1981 (1988), was convicted of murder and sentenced to 
death. Three aggravating circumstances provided the 
basis for the sentence. One of these concerned a prior 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to another. 
In Johnson's case a 1963 New York conviction for the 
crime of second-degree assault with intent to commit 
rape was introduced. After the Mississippi conviction, 
Johnson's attorneys successfully challenged the 1963 
conviction in the New York courts. They then moved to 
vacate the Mississippi death sentence because it had 
been based on an invalid New York conviction. The 
Mississippi Supreme Court rejected the motion. 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court held that an invalid conviction meant that Johnson 
should be presumed innocent, unless and until he was 
retried and convicted. Since only the record of conviction 
was admitted in the sentencing hearing, the State could 
not argue that the underlying conduct was sufficient to 
uphold the death penalty. In support of its decision, the 
Court cited two aspects of its Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence as relevant to Johnson's situation. First, 
the Court wrote: "The fundamental respect for humanity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment gives rise to a special 
'need for reliability in the determination that death is the 
appropriate punishment' in any capital case." /d. at 1986 
(quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977). 
Second, the Court had made clear that death penalty 
decisions could not be predicated on mere "caprice" or 
on "factors that are constitutionally impermissible or 
totally irrelevant to the sentencing process." /d. (quoting 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 884-85 (1983). 
Aggravating Circumstances- Vagueness 
The defendant in Maynard v. Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. 
1853 (1988), was convicted of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to death. The jury found two aggravating 
circumstances: the defendant knowingly created a great 
risk of death to more than one person, and the murder 
was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel." Cartwright 
challenged the second aggravating circumstances, argu-
ing that it was unconstitutionally vague. The Tenth Circuit 
had upheld that argument and the Supreme Court 
affirmed. 
The Court initially distinguished vagueness issues 
under the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amend-
ment. Vagueness questions under Due Process are 
based on a lack of notice and can be overcome in any 
case where reasonable persons would know that their 
conduct was at risk. Unless First Amendment interests 
are implicated, a criminal statute is judged for vagueness 
on an "as-applied" basis. 
The Eighth Amendment analysis is derived from 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S, 238 {1972), where the Court 
struck down the death penalty as arbitrary and capri-
cious because it provided no principled way to distin-
guish those that received the death penalty from those 
who did not. As the Court remarked: "Since Furman, our 
cases have insisted that the channeling and limiting of 
the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty 
is a fundamental constitutional requirement for sufficient-
ly minimizing the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious 
action." 108 S.Ct. at 1858. Applying this standard in 
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), the Court st;uck 
down a death sentence based on an aggravating circum-
stance that the killing was "outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible or inhuman." According to the Court, the vague 
construction of these words provided "no principled way 
to distinguish this case, in which the death penalty was 
imposed, from the many cases in which it was not." /d. at 
433. Similarly, the aggravating circumstance in Cart-
wright- "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel"-
gave no more guidance and thus violated Eighth Amend-
ment requirements. 
Mitigating Circumstances 
Ralph Mills was convicted of the first-degree murder of 
his cellmate and sentenced to death. In Mills v. Mary-
land, 108 S.Ct. 1860 (1988), he successfully challenged 
that sentence. 
After determining guilt, the jury found an aggravating 
circumstance- namely, that Mills committed murder 
while confined in a correctional institution. The jury was 
then to consider mitigating circumstances, after which it 
was to balance the aggravating circumstances against 
the mitigating circumstances in determining whether the 
death penalty was appropriate. The defense offered 
evidence in mitigation: Mills' relative youth, his mental 
infirmity, his lack of future dangerousness, and the 
State's failure to make any meaningful effort to rehabili-
tate him while incarcerated. On the verdict form, the jury 
marked "no" beside each mitigating circumstance and 
returned the death penalty. Mills argued that jury instruc-
tions and the verdict form led the jury to believe that it 
had to agree unanimously to a mitigating circumstance 
before it could balance that circumstance against the 
aggravating circumstances. Thus, even if eleven jurors 
believe some mitigating circumstance or circumstances 
were present, they would mark "no" on the form and 
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thereby be foreclosed from considering that factor. 
On review, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The 
Court reaffirmed its earlier position concerning mitigat-
ing circumstances. "It is beyond dispute that in a capital 
case, the sentencer [may] not be precluded from 
considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defen-
dant's character or record and any of the circumstances 
of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a 
sentence less than death.' "/d. at 1865 (quoting Eddings 
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982)). In Mills' view a 
single juror could not hold out because there must be 
unanimity before a mitigating factor could be considered. 
The critical issue was the jury's understanding of the 
instruction. In reviewing death sentences, the Court has 
required greater certainty that jury conclusions rested on 
proper grounds. In particular, if two interpretations of the 
instructions are possible and one interpretation is 
improper, the death sentence must be vacated. 
We conclude that there is a substantial probability 
that reasonable jurors, upon receiving the judge's 
instructions in this case, and in attempting to complete 
the verdict form as instructed, well may have thought 
they were precluded from considering any mitigating 
evidence unless all12 jurors agreed on the existence 
of a particular such circumstance. Under our cases, 
the sentencer must be permitted to consider all 
mitigating evidence. /d. at 1870. 
Jury Instructions 
The defendant in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 108 S.Ct. 546 
(1988), was convicted of 2 counts of manslaughter and 3 
counts of first-degree murder. Thereafter, the jury began 
deliberating on the death sentence. The next day the 
foreman advised the court that the jurors were unable to 
reach a decision. The court polled the jury, asking wheth-
er each member believed that further deliberation would 
be helpful. Eight jurors answered in the affirmative, and 
the court sent the jury back to deliberate. A second note 
from the foreman indicated that some jurors misunder-
stood the poll. A second poll revealed that 11 jurors 
believed further deliberations would be advisable. The 
court then instructed the jury to consult and consider 
each other's views with the objective of reaching a 
verdict, but not to surrender their own honest beliefs. The 
jury returned 30 minutes later with a verdict sentencing 
the defendant to death on all three counts of first-degree 
murder. On appeal, the defendant argued that the polls 
and supplemental instruction coerced the jury into 
imposing the death penalty. 
On review, the Court rejected this argument. The Court 
saw little difference between the supplemental charge 
and the traditional Allen charge. In Allen v. United States, 
164 U.S. 492 (1896), the Court upheld a charge that 
urged minority members of a hung jury to consider the 
views of the majority and to ask themselves whether their 
own views were reasonable under the circumstances. 
The Court reaffirmed the Allen charge and pointed out 
that the instruction in Lowentield was even less coercive 
because it was not directed at minority jurors. The Court 
also distinguished its decision in Jenkins v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 445 (1965). In that case the trial judge 
instructed the jury: "You have got to reach a decision in 
this case." /d. at 446. The Court found this statement to 
be coercive. IheJnstruction in Lowenfie/d, however,-was 
different. It did not require the jurors to reach a decision. 
Moreover, the polling of the jury by the trial court was not 
prejudicial. The judge had not inquired into the numerical 
divisio11 of the jurors, which conduct was found to be 
coerciv(3 in Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448 
(1926). Rather, the court inquired only about whether 
further deliberations would be helpful. 
DISCOVERY 
The defendant in Taylor v. Illinois, 108 S.Ct. 646 (1988), 
was convicted of attempted murder. Prior to trial the 
prosecution tiled acinotion requesting a list of defense 
witnesses pursuant to the state discovery rules. In 
response, the defense identified four witnesses. The 
defense amended its list on the first day of trial, adding 
two more names. On. the second day of trial, after the 
prosecution's two principal witnesses had testified, the 
defense attorney made an oral motion to add other 
witnesses. Counsel stated that he had just been 
informed about the witnesses and had not been able to 
locate any of them previously. During a subsequent hear-
ing on this motion, one of the witnesses testified that 
counsel had visited his home a week before the trial. This 
testimony contradicted defense counsel's representa-
tions to the trial court. The court excluded the witness's 
testimony because counsel's conduct constituted a 
"blatantyiolati_o_n of the _discove_ry ru!es." Tayior argued 
that the 1mpos1t1on of th1s sanct1on VIolated his right to 
compulsory process. 
On review, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's 
ruling~ The Court's opinion, however, contained limiting 
lang!J.~g.§1, £ir§!.J.h~ (:qurt rejected the State's argument 
that the Compulsory Process Clause implicated only the 
right to subpoena witnesses. The Court rejected this 
narrow interpretatioriolfne Clause:·· · 
The right to compel a witness' presence in the court-
room could not protect the integrity of the adversary 
process if it did not embrace the right to have the 
witness' testimony heard by the trier of fact. The right 
to offer testimony is thus grounded in the Sixth Amend-
ment even though it is not expressly described in so 
many words. /d. at 652. 
The right to present defense evidence, however, is not 
absolute. It is limited by the State's interest in the orderly 
conduct of a criminal trial, including the enforcement of 
discovery sanctions. While the Court acknowledged that 
preclusion of evidence was a drastic remedy, it was not 
willing to forbid its use in the appropriate case. In the 
Court's view, other sanctions would be less effective. The 
trial court may insist on an explanation when a party fails 
to comply with a discovery order. 
If that explanation reveals that the omission was willful 
and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advan-
tage that would minimize the effectiveness of cross-
examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal 
evidence, it would be entirely consistent with the 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause simply to 
exclude the witness' testimony. /d. at 655-56. . 
The Court also found the sanction appropriate in this 
case. The trial court found a willful and blatant violation 
a finding that was supported by the record. Finally, the ' 
Court saw nothing wrong with holding the client respon-
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sible.for~his counsel's conduct; clients often must accept 
the consequences of their attorney's tactical decisions. 
"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE 
The defendant in Huddleston v. United States, 108 
?.Ct. 1496 (1988), was charged with possessing and sell-
mg stolen goods (video cassette tapes) in interstate 
commerce. There was no dispute that the tapes were 
stolen; the only issue was whether Huddleston knew that 
they were stolen. To prove knowledge, the prosecution 
offered evidence of "other acts" under Federal Evidence 
Rl,!!e 4Q.1(!2l,w!Jigb provides: 
Evidence ofothercdn1~s. wrongs, or acts is not admis-
sible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
One "other act'' involved Huddleston's selling of televi-
sion sets for very low prices. A second "other act" 
involved ttie selling of kitchen appliances for $8000 when'· 
the actual cost was $20,000. These appliances had been 
stolen. Huddleston claimed that he sold all these items 
for Leroy Wesby on a commission basis and that he did 
not know that they were stolen. 
On appeal, Huddleston argued that the probative 
value of the television sales depended on theii "stolen" 
character and that the prosecution never established that 
the televisions were in fact stolen. The admissibility issue 
depended on the proper standard of proof, an issue on 
which the circuit courts had divided. Some courts had 
concludedthat"the prosecution must prove the "other 
act" by a "preponderance of evidence." Others had ruled 
that a "clear and convincing evidence" standard must be 
satisfied, Still others had held that the trial judge's deci-
sion was limited to determining whether sufficient 
evidence from which a jury could find the existence of the 
other act was the applicable standard. 
. On review, the Supreme Court adopted the last posi-
tion. Based on Evidence Rule 104(b), this is, in effect, a 
prima facie evidence standard. The Court explained: 
In determining whether the Government has 
in_troduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the 
tnal court neither weighs credibility nor makes a find-
ing that the Government has proved the conditional 
fact [stolen TVs] by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The court simply examines all the evidence in the case 
and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the 
conditional fact-here, that the televisions were 
stolen-by a preponderance of the evidence. /d. at 
1501. 
According to the Court, the large quantity, the low price, 
the lack of a bill of sale, and the sale of other stolen 
merchandise satisfied this standard. 
ENTRAPMENT 
. Matthews v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 883 (1988), 
mvolved the entrapment defense. Employed by the Small 
Business Administration, Matthews was charged with 
accepting a bribe. He was arrested when he took money 
from a participant in a S.B.A. program. He sought to raise 
an entrapment defense because the participant was 
working with the F.B.I. at the time of the payment. The 
district court, however, refused to instruct on entrapment 
because Matthews would not admit committing all the 
elements of the crime, in particular the mens rea 
element. Matthews claimed the money was a personal 
loan unrelated to S.B.A. business. 
On review, the Supreme Court upheld Matthew's view; 
denying the charge and asserting the affirmative defense 
of entrapment is permissible. Under federal law, entrap-
ment has two elements: government inducement of the 
crime, and lack of predisposition on the part of the defen-
dant to engage in criminal conduct. See Hampton v. Unit-
ed States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 
369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). 
The prosecution argued that entrapment presupposed 
the commission of the crime and a jury could not logical-
ly conclude that Matthews had both failed to commit the 
crime and been entrapped. The Court, however, saw 
nothing unusual about pleading inconsistent defenses. 
For example, in Stevenson v. United States, 162 ~.S. 313 
(1896), the Court had held that a murder defendant was 
entitled to both a manslaughter and self-defense instruc-
tion: "The affirmative defense of self-defense is, of 
course, inconsistent with the claim that the defendant 
killed in the heat of passion." 108 S.Ct. at 887. 
Two points about Matthews are noteworthy. The entrap-
ment defense is not constitutionally based, and thus the 
case affects only federal prosecutions. In addition, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion. A Rehnquist opin-
ion that favors a criminal defendant is a rather unique 
event. 
SPEEDY TRIAL 
United States v. Taylor, 108 S.Ct. 2413 (1988), involved 
the circumstances under which a district court could 
dismiss a case with prejudice as a remedy for a violation 
of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Taylor was indicted for 
conspiracy to distribute cocaine and possession of 
cocaine with intent to distribute. His case was scheduled 
for trial the day prior to the expiration of the 70-day period 
within which the Act requires the prosecution to bring an 
indicted defendant to trial. Taylor, however, failed to 
appear and a bench warrant was issued. He was subse-
quently arrested on state charges that were later 
dismissed. Commencement of his federal trial was 
delayed for a number of reasons, including his appear-
ance as a defense witness in another case and slow 
processing by the Government. A superseding indict-
ment, adding a failure-to-appear charge, was eventually 
returned. 
Taylor then moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. 
The district court ruled that some of the delay was 
reasonable and thus excludable in computing the 70-day 
period. Fourteen days of delay, however, were due to the 
Government's "lackadaisical behavior" and resulted in a 
violation of the Act. Accordingly, the court dismissed the 
original counts with prejudice to reprosecution. 
On review, the Supreme Court reversed. The issue 
before the Court was whether the district court had 
abused its discretion in dismissing with prejudice. 
s.ection 3162(a)(2) provides: "In determining whether to 
dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall 
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consider, among others, each of the following factors: the 
seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances 
of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of 
a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and 
on the administration of justice." In addition, the legisla-
tive history indicates that prejudice to the defendant is a 
relevant factor. Unfortunately, the district court failed to 
specify how it evaluated these factors. In particular, the 
defendant's conduct in failing to appear for trial was 
apparently not considered. The Court wrote: 
The court did not explain how it factored in the serious-
ness of the offenses with which respondent stood 
charged. The District Court relied heavily on its unex-
plained characterization of the Government conduct 
as "lackadaisical," while failing to consider other rele-
vant facts and circumstances leading to dismissal. 
Seemingly ignored were the brevity of the delay and 
the consequential lack of prejudice to respondent, as 
well as respondent's own illicit contribution to the delay. 
At bottom, the District Court appears t6 have decided 
to dismiss with prejudice in this case in order to send a 
strong message to the Government that unexcused 
delays will not be tolerated. That factor alone, by defini-
tion implicated in almost every Speedy Trial Act case, 
does not suffice to justify barring reprosecution in light 
of all the other circumstances present. /d. at 2423. 
GRAND JURY 
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 108 S.Ct. 2373 
(1988}, involved a 20-month grand jury investigation, 
which resulted in the indictment of eight defendants on 
27 counts, including conspiracy, mail fraud, and tax 
fraud. The district court dismissed the indictments for 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
The District Court found that the Government had 
violated Federal Rule Criminal Procedure 6(e) by: (1} 
disclosing grand jury materials to Internal Revenue 
Service employees having civil tax enforcement 
responsibilities; (2) failing to give the court prompt 
notice of such disclosures; (3) disclosing to potential 
witnesses the names of targets of the investigation; 
and (4) instructing two grand jury witnesses, who had 
represented some of the defendants in a separate 
investigation of the same tax shelters, that they were 
not to reveal the substance of their testimony or that 
they had testified before the grand jury. The court also 
found that the Government had violated Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 6(d) in allowing joint appear-
ances by IRS agents before the grand jury for the 
purpose of reading transcripts to the jurors. The 
District Court further concluded that one of the prose-
cutors improperly argued with an expert witness 
during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave 
testimony adverse to the Government. It also held that 
the Government had violated the witness immunity 
statute ... , by the use of "pocket immunity" (immunity 
granted on representation of the prosecutor rather 
than by order of a judge), and that the Government 
caused IRS agents to mischaracterize testimony given 
in prior proceedings. Furthermore, the District Court 
found that the Government violated the Fifth Amend-
ment by calling a number of witnesses for the sole 
purpose of having them assert their privilege against 
self-incrimination and that it had violated the Sixth 
Amendment by conducting postindictment interviews 
of several high-level employees of The Bank of Nova 
Scotia. Finally, the court concluded that the Govern-
ment had caused IRS agents to be sworn as agents of 
the grand jury, thereby elevating their credibility. /d. at 
2375-76. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, 
the Court reversed. Initially, the Court ruled that "as a 
general matter, a District Court may not dismiss an indict-
ment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such 
errors prejudiced the defendants." /d. at 2373. The Court 
based its ruling on its reading of Rule 52( a), which 
requires a harmless error analysis: "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial 
rights shall be disregarded." In this context, "dismissal of 
an indictment is appropriate only 'if it is established that 
the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's 
decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the deci-
sion to indict was free from the substantial influence of 
such violations." /d. at 2374 (quoting United Statesv. 
Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986)(0'Connor, J., concur-
ring). The Court recognized, however, that some viola-
tions require automatic reversal without a harmless error 
inquiry. For example, racial discrimination in the selec-
tion of grand jurors, Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 
(1986), and the exclusion of women, Ballard v. United 
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946), require automatic dismissaL 
Those violations, however, were constitutional and a 
harmless error analysis would have required unguided 
speculation. 
Her(3, the Court found no constitutional violation. The 
Sixth_Amendment posHndictment violations (interviews 
with Bank officials) occurred after the grand jury had 
handed down the indictments. In addition, the Court 
found no Fifth Amendment violation. The prosecution 
was not required to accept a witness' claim of the privi-
lege before testifying; the witnesses could be called and 
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forced to claim the privilege under oath, so long as ques-
tioning ceased once the privilege was claimed. 
According to the Court, many of the Ru~e 6 violations 
did not affect the grand jury's decision. The use of the ( 
grand jury to gather evidence in civil audits, the violation 
of the secrecy provisions by publicly identifying targets, 
and the imposed secrecy requirements on witnesses all 
fell into this category. 
A detailed analysis of other types of violations led the 
Court to the same result. Swearing IRS agents as 
"agents" of the grand jury did not mislead the jurors 
because the record showed that the prosecutors treated 
themastfleitown'witriesses, <ifaGt that the jurors under-
stood. Moreover, the presentation of inaccurate 
summaries by the IRS agents is not a ground for dismiss-
al. An indictment valid on its face cannot be attached on 
the ground that it is based on unreliable or incompetent 
evidence. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
Although the prosecutors may have had doubts about 
the summaries, the record did not support a finding that 
they knew the summaries were false. Moreover, the Gov-
ernment conceded that the treatment of the tax expert 
was improper, but the expert testified that this conduct 
had not affected his testimony. The Court declined to 
decide whether the use of "pocket immunity" was prop-
er. Instead, the Court ruled that this procedure did not 
affect the grand jury decision. The jurors knew that these 
witnesses had made a dea! with the Government and 
that was the relevant consideration. Other errors cited by 
the District Court were treated in the same fashion. 
None, in the Court's view, affected the grand jury's deter-
mination. 
Finally, the Court noted the availability of other less 
drastic remedies for such alleged violations. These 
includecontempt, disciplinary sanctions, and public 
ceiisurEi "Sucfiremeaies allow the court to focus on the 
culpable individual rather than granting a windfall to the 
unprejudiced defendant." 108 S.Ct. at 2378. 
